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Winning the Digital War: Cyber Ideology and the Spectrum of
Conflict
Abstract
Cyberspace allows ideology to dictate who wins a war. That technological medium has
marginalized violence to such an extent that a belligerent must make a cognitive effort a
priority. That focus means humanity has at last reached a coveted threshold where ideas
determine a war’s outcome. This article traces that evolution along the “spectrum of
conflict,” a military categorization encompassing all of war. This act of reductionism must
confront cyber realities that alter an understanding of war as one driven by acts of
violence. This feat means a digital peace finds an equal footing with war arising from a
cyber ideological conflict. That conflict rests on cyber rebellions derived from an online
interface contested in content but able to withstand the pull of government oversight.
Stripped of violence as an absolute defining war, cognitive war becomes of paramount
importance as a broad intellectualism compels a state of war. Ideology comes less from a
meaning shaped by political context and more from online access impacting political
norms. This contest in cyberspace means winning the digital war requires an open
interface to pressure authoritarian regimes into reform, all the while allowing for much of
this same friction that arises in states favoring democracy. Finding that balance arrests the
endless process of war as the chief means of human interaction.
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Introduction
Cyber ideology best captures the primary means of warfare in the cyber
domain. Any conflict in cyberspace relegates violence to a secondary even
tertiary effect, paving the way for a cognitive battle online. This
confrontation overwhelmingly favors nations supporting “openness,” that
is, the free exchange of information online. In this mix lies a clash over
values stemming from a social interaction as a needed interchange given
human disposition and in offering the means to improve the human
condition. This online quality tests political systems as those seeking
centralized control look to contain openness, while those favoring
democratic government attempt to ensure unfettered access online all the
while shoring up their own vulnerabilities. Technology may allow a
plethora of options when online, and it stands to enrich social interaction
as a result, but other realities strive to curtail this connectivity. Hence, the
ideological struggle online emerges as ideas determine the validity of user
access.
The cyber war over ideological consensus forces those so engaged both to
preserve the digital medium on which the war is waged and to control it.
Such sparring raises issues of what constitutes the natural state of online
use and how this standing corresponds to human activity. But what that
struggle looks like requires explication seeking a measure of war along
what the U.S. military calls the “spectrum of conflict.” That continuum
presently exists without a measure of the impact of cyberspace on that
axis. This article takes that step leaving war looking different from a
measure of physical harm imposed by one party on another; rather, a
cyber war exists on a cognitive plane devoid of physical violence. With
violence marginalized, this article’s thesis is that the online battlefield
allows belligerents to resolve tensions short of armed conflict producing
an ideological confrontation across an open Internet.
That battlefield in cyberspace means popular uprisings against authority
have received a new lease on life.1 Social media has fostered online
activism to such a point as to bolster the means of organization and
objection to oppressive rulers. Thousands upon thousands of people use
these channels to help marshal that opposition. They also risk persecution
at the hands of repressive regimes looking to crush internal dissent.
Worse, nations cherishing the openness of the Internet may act in similar
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fashion as authoritarian states and restrict online access. The United
States currently weighs the pros and cons of increased controls to counter
the growing threat of political violence at home propelled by online
forums, best exemplified by the recent storming of the U.S. Capitol by a
mob unleashed by the Trump administration’s false claims of election
fraud. That shocking spectacle may register in many ways, but it best
serves to remind the United States to safeguard an open Internet to
compel an ideological showdown online. Winning the cyber war means
accepting the friction this technology introduces into the governing
process to pressure authoritarian regimes to reform. That tradeoff forces
Americans to live up to the ideals that established the nation, chief among
them that citizens do not meet differing views with acts of violence. Cyber
realities could break the nation or lead it to rekindle its global mission of
defending democracy, a mission that starts at home.

The Nature of War
To assess the experience of war starts with a consensus in military circles
that the nature of war is unchanging, only its character changes. The
nature of war consists of several constants including friction, chance, and
genius. Friction ensures that once a military action unfolds, plans will go
astray, and consequences will arise producing unwanted and unintended
effects. Chance explains those things that contribute to friction and are
often out of human control or arise inadvertently because of human
activity. Genius speaks to the ability of certain individuals to overcome
these issues, not to prevent them, but to overcome them. These aspects of
the nature of war, in this case coming from Carl von Clausewitz’s study, On
War, and any other aspects one may add, are select and limited.2 For this
reason, attention quickly pivots to defining the changing character of war.
The character of war is ever expanding given new weapons and tactics
introduced to the battlefield. Change appears endemic to the definition,
upending the construct that the nature of war never changes. Many uphold
the new in the name of modernity as each age announces its weapons as
revolutionary and promising to reshape the battlefield. Examples include
the flourishing of military innovation prior to the Second World War.3
“Effects based operations” arose in the 1980s-1990s, followed by
“netcentric” warfare.4 Frequently these modern developments do bring
change. However, a closer look acknowledges that the new weapons may
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well change the character of war, but not the nature of war, meaning
friction, chance, and genius. No weapon system has overcome or
disavowed these constants.
The unchanging nature of war but its expansive character makes for a
striking continuum, a small constant comprising the nature of war, and an
ever-expanding set of factors accounting for its changing character (see
Figure 1):
Figure 1
The Nature of War

Unchanging
Nature of War

Always Changing Character of War

Source: This figure and the following figures created by the author.
The construct’s chief importance lies in the quest of military personnel to
seek timeless principles of war. No matter the age, certain things will
always be present and found in the unchanging nature of war. For the U.S.
military, should one grasp such basic tasks as mass and maneuver,
deception, leadership, and the will to fight, they stand to be the more
capable warfighters. The Marine Corps calls this goal “maneuver warfare,”
a mandate repeated in Joint doctrine.5 The U.S. Army stresses four “tenets
of unified land operations” consisting of simultaneity, depth,
synchronization, flexibility.6 These capabilities can surmount friction and
survive chance due to an almost learned genius. To gain this skill requires
an intensive study of war. Finding something quantifiable in the long
history of war brings comfort to military personnel. Seeing patterns and
continuity across time identifies the means one can point to and rely on to
excel at warfighting to master the ugly reality of war.
Cyberspace may well upset this calculation. That new space may have
changed the nature of war making principles harder to determine. Former
U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis appears one of few voices open to
this change when he pointed to the advent of AI as possibly changing the
nature of war.7 At a minimum, increased complexity due to expanding war
into the cyber domain means new patterns or possibly the invalidation of
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past patterns defining the character of war. Either way, having to
recalibrate the principles of war places an unwelcomed burden on the
warfighter. The student of war must thoughtfully conduct this analysis or
risk losing the next war. Given the stakes, one can understand the
apprehension among military professionals as they take a measure of
cyberspace as a warzone.

The Spectrum of Conflict
The trepidation of having to learn new, key aspects of war appears valid
because cyber realities prompt one to ask if war must include acts of
physical violence via combat arms producing death and destruction as a
measure of force. This common view of war looks like the following along
the spectrum of conflict (see Figure 2):
Figure 2
Peace

War

Army uses of this construct vary a bit, from a U.S. Army graphic depicting
a “spectrum of combat” and a “spectrum of peace” in Army Vision 2010, a
document the Army released in 2005 to take ownership of its contribution
to joint operations in pursuit of “full spectrum dominance” across a
“spectrum of crisis.” By 2008, “spectrum of conflict” was in place as a
backdrop for Army Operations.8 The Marine Corps was more
consistent. In two documents spanning eight years, from 1989 to 1997, the
spectrum of conflict refers to actions meriting restraint of military force
and those where restraint is absent given a state of general war.9
Regardless of the depiction, violence stands as the foremost indicator of
where one sits on this continuum. One gets closer to peace with the
absence of violence. The reality of war grows clear with the onset of
violence. Cyber appears to have changed the nature of war by stripping
that measure of violence from war. But war never rested on only military
arms dispensing violence. Its dimensions always grew bigger than this.
One must contemplate the use of force without combat, or a state of war
without violence. An actor can apply force via instruments of power short
of physical violence. A broader understanding of force absent physical acts
of violence creates room for the cognitive struggle defining war. Still, the
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nature of war does not change. Rather, with cyber, war now includes the
primacy of intellectual acts.
In making this intellectual side of war paramount, cyber gets us back to
what war is supposed to be, or can be, and that is conflict as an argument.
This end achieves Plato's ‘political man’ in The Republic, where humanity
seeks rationalization through philosophical inquiry to attain the “good life”
via argumentation rather than force. To engage argumentation as an act of
war leaves one with a broad understanding of war, but another simple
continuum charts this sensible conclusion (see Figure 3):
Figure 3
War

War

Stressing this intellectual parameter leads one to the view that there will
always be war. The oldest military maxim asserts that humans will fight
and there will always be war because of that fact. But physical violence is
not its foremost measure. Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu got at this
distinction long ago. In his famed, The Art of War, when seeking to defeat
an enemy short of the use of military arms, he wrote, "To subdue the
enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."10 War does, in fact, remain a
constant, but the means of war clearly hinge on intellectual confrontation
rather than meting out physical violence.
As sure as there is war, less certain is peace; just as war will always take
place, peace can never be at hand. Even the complete elimination of the
enemy means no matter who survives, conflict, and, therefore, war, is the
result. Allies will fray and one of them will assume the role of adversary
leaving once unified victors to clash among themselves. One way or
another, war will reoccur.
This reality presents one measure of absolute war, promising that war will
always happen and not end. Cyber adds to this reality, meaning that the
advent of cyberspace has not changed the nature of war. Rather, cyber
realities suggest that war looks different from war resting solely on
violence via use of force. Acts of physical violence certainly help define
war, but those acts highlight conflict featuring the cognitive struggle
defining argumentation.
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No Peace on the Spectrum of Conflict
The idea of always facing war via intellectual threats and at times facing
threats of physical violence soon encounters a nature of war that offers
another measure of war as delivering complete destruction. One exists
along an axis offering degrees of war. To stay far left limits war, but does
not deliver peace. A move right invites total war. An escalation to the right
renders wars more physical and feared and therefore restricted, if possible,
all the while accepting war as a perpetual condition of existence.
Consequently, the continuum now defines war as a spectrum of conflict
within two parameters as follows (see Figure 4):
Figure 4
Limited War

Total War

One should fear total war since nuclear weapons have indeed meant an
absolute as the complete destruction of humanity. A total war now has a
face. Limited war acts as a good since it curbs this threat of complete
destruction. Now war assumes a second reason for an absolute. Not only is
it always present as part of human existence, but obliteration of humanity
as an absolute exists as well. On the continuum, an absolute peace fades
further from view, peace meaning no outright hostilities but always
preparing for war or being on-guard from a horrible end. That preparation
accepts the absolute of war, even total war. There is now one absolute, but
not another. An absolute war exists but not an absolute peace prompting a
need to correct the illogic of the continuum: If absolute war is possible, so
too is absolute peace.
Unfortunately, things do not improve as the continuum gains more items.
Genocide presents another absolute defining total war. That alarming end
registers fear with no optimism or hope of something better other than
lesser acts of war. Here, kinds of war surface and these take many labels:
Small, irregular, unconventional, people’s war, all existing along the
spectrum of conflict. The labels abound but the concept dictates a linear
progression. A move from left to right takes one from unconventional to
conventional war (see Figure 5):
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Figure 5
Unconventional War

Conventional War

In this way, an absolute war again surfaces as a norm since conventional
war will equate with total war and the goal to destroy an enemy.
Conventional use of force refers to those armies enjoying a tremendous
advantage in combat arms, and therefore seeking the obliteration of the
enemy, or total war. Its place on the far right is clear. Unconventional
refers to those contesting that overwhelming military power and having to
do so well short of any ability to stand up and face the enemy in combat.
The continuum does not measure peace as again war is the norm, only
war’s manifestation is in doubt.
The more useful message with plotting unconventional and conventional
war along a continuum is that to sit on the far-left means seeking other
means of contesting enemy strength, offering more of an intellectual
challenge. The trajectory looks like this (see Figure 6):
Figure 6
Unconventional War
Intellectual Challenge

Conventional War
Physical Brawn

Violence is present on either end, but the violence goes mute on the left.
On the right, a reliance on physical force of arms remains the norm. This
view shows that one likely does more thinking when in a position of
inferiority of combat arms and does less thinking when enjoying a
preponderance of strength and seeking a conventional fight. The issue
becomes one of asking how much intellectualism impacts war, and should
be in war.
Any continuum at this point looks like following (see Figure 7):
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Figure 7
War
Limited War
Unconventional War
High Intellectualism

War
Total War
Conventional War
Low Intellectualism

Cyber uproots this view because of the difficulty of classifying a cyber war.
With no violence, war becomes a lost sighting. Cyber expert Thomas Rid
casts this need for violence firmly in the tradition of Clausewitz when he
paraphrases the master: “All war, pretty simply, is violent.”11 War seeks
out physical force to break an opponent’s will and net a political gain.
Without the violence, the strife in cyberspace presents sabotage,
espionage, and subversion as the mainstay of conflict in that domain. In
Rid’s estimation, this reality is different from war.
In that case, a continuum with cyber suggests only a cognitive means of
warfare, and therefore an intellectual showdown as war. Stealing data,
interdicting connectivity mixes with outright subterfuge via messaging and
looks like the following (see Figure 8):
Figure 8

Messaging

Sabotage
Interdiction
Espionage

Gravitating toward messaging certainly shapes a cognitive battlefield and
takes one away from any physical measure that might be found at the
opposite end of this continuum. No matter the intellectual strife, one could
say peace triumphs across the flow of information merely impacted by a
means of warfare bereft of violence.
While this cyber battlefield may lack violence, the prospect of war looms
large. Many experts reject the view that no war occurs in the domain
because violence does not lurk there. Some declare a war is afoot even
without physical conflict. Coercion due to use of force remains prominent,
even if violence does not kill people. For instance, John Stone writes, “Acts
of war involve the application of force to produce violent effects. These
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violent effects need not be lethal in character.”12 Force defines war, not the
cost in lives. Timothy J. Junio essentially agrees, writing that, “if cyber war
happens, it will be extremely costly even if not lethal.”13
Given the assumed stakes of the struggle there, a war is the best
determination. Certainly, Plato’s classification of war as argumentation
comes back to the forefront of things. Beyond cognitive realities, to fully
account for digital hacks, intrusions, and attacks, the physical does matter
a great deal in terms of the potential to cripple a power grid or some other
critical infrastructure of a nation via online attack. While this possibility is
extreme, it is still possible. Conversely, on the purely cognitive end stands
the ability to impart political change based on a sharing of information
alone fostering “cyber rebellions.”14 In other words, connectivity shapes
the following battlefield, positioning war as the chief concern in
cyberspace (see Figure 9):
Figure 9
Cyber Rebellions

Infrastructure

One is purely cognitive, the other physical. In between comes a struggle
over the openness of the Internet functioning in cyberspace. On the left
sits a struggle over ideology, on the right a need to prevent an overt, online
attack.

A Cyber Cognitive War
The cyber lens underscores that war is primarily a clash over ideas. If an
enemy cannot be destroyed, and if peace is impossible, and the various
continuums say this is so, then the war continues albeit on a much more
cognitive basis. In short, military action, no matter how violent, cannot
wipe out the thinking that helped foster the war. To break the enemy’s will
(mentality) may be the main goal of any war, but that end comes with an
understanding that physical violence only gets one part of the way there. 15
In this context, the violence at the hands of armies is supposed to push the
conflict into the cognitive realm on terms most favorable to the side
enjoying a preponderance of physical strength. Of course, the vanquished
can look to the other extreme, and along this axis see mental defiance as
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the final place of resistance, and the best means of doing so for how does
one defeat the mind?
Cyberspace presents an answer. In the rampaging of cyber ideology lays a
struggle in that domain completely in favor of states embracing openness.
The push for an unfettered exchange of information as empowering a
community sparks a cognitive challenge to all those opposing this norm.
This axis places openness on one end, surveillance on the other (see Figure
10):
Figure 10
Openness

Surveillance

The contested space in between amounts to a cognitive war, a struggle to
convince users of the dangers of being online if one seeks to overturn
openness as a norm, and an online struggle to welcome users to engage in
discourse, not just free of government oversight, but as a means of defying
that idea of control, if one supports openness. No violence marks this
confrontation, but the struggle over ideas in cyberspace defines war itself.
The inability of conventional force to achieve a 'decisive' end drives
conflict into this intellectual arena where war assumes its true nature, a
cognitive struggle to determine victory. This cyber battle ensures that the
intellectual imperative that always defined war has overcome violence
along the spectrum of conflict producing a state of war without physical
violence.
The cyber war as ideological struggle does not mean an end of conflict,
only a war on favorable terms to those states embracing openness. At last,
a combatant can team a physical domination with a mental assault as well
that speaks to achieving victory and seeing peace as a real possibility, even
if remaining at cognitive war. Peace gains meaning as the absence of
purposely violent acts seeking physical destruction and loss of life. For this
reason, war becomes an intellectual act first. In other words, resorting to
violence constitutes an admission of inferior ideas, that one has lost the
intellectual battle.
Once free of violence, warfare now becomes a means of cognitive struggle,
the battlefield the cyber domain. Here, any combatant at tremendous
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disadvantage in a physical confrontation will find another application of
war that may yield better results. This thinking means the range of war
acts moves from primarily a physical embrace of violence to a shunning of
violence altogether in favor of a strictly cognitive battle. The cognitive
showdown in cyberspace is as genuine as any war witnessing the use of
violence, making the strife there something far greater than crime or
espionage. In the ideological implications of cyberspace rests a struggle to
advance the democratic process and to deny it. The good news for cultures
supposedly tied to that democratic tradition becomes their ability to
pursue this kind of representative government by defending the openness
of the cyber domain, always shorn of violence as the chief measure of war.
While strife besets this virtual world as much as the physical one, the
trajectory along the spectrum of conflict speaks to finding virtue in a
supremacy of arms predicated on an elevation of ideas as the primary
means of conflict in war. The measure of this dynamic remains a focus on
cyber ideology, and one can find much encouragement in this now
bloodless pursuit.
In this view, war always spoke to hopefully mitigating violence, and
therefore sparing life and property. This result came from embracing the
use of force to such a point that war would be so horrible that actors would
refuse to take this step. This belief came after a long period of trial and
error where use of force represented a means of quick victory, shielding all
combatants from the worst impact of war, if one could prosecute the war
successfully. Still, even in the few instances of such military success,
another war followed, and another after that. The recourse to physical
destruction of the enemy no matter how contrived proved incapable of
netting an end to war.

A Digital Peace
Technology has all but delivered this result of ending war, forcing those
less prepared to wage a conventional fight to seek out other ways of
challenging a militarily imposed supremacy. Violent acts continue, but the
desired brevity of war due to the threat of death and destruction, the desire
to limit war to avoid that same end, speaks to getting past violence as the
primary means of conflict. Cyber has helped make this aim possible.
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A closer look at the rise of cyber realities and their impact on conflict in
terms of the ideological struggle in this domain reveals that one has
reached a point exposing the inadequacy of measuring war as mainly a
contest of violence. Instead, victory as a measure of peace comes into view.
Here cyber makes its definitive contribution to war. War consists of the
standalone, intellectual confrontation in cyberspace, warfare the effort to
enjoy superiority in that cognitive fight in the cyber domain. War
continues, but that war does indeed, can indeed, assume a purely
intellectual dimension. With no physical and material destruction, a
spectrum of conflict yields to a continuum of peace, or where Rid
suggested things should stand (see Figure 11):
Figure 11
Peace

Deterrence

In between the two extremes comes a series or stages of peace, not kinds of
wars along a spectrum of conflict. One could see peaceful coexistence, an
alliance, or mutual standoff all existing on a continuum of peace.
Reintroducing peace perhaps represents the most useful element of the
continuum, except for again clashing with absolutes. There cannot be an
absolute peace or total peace; but a total war is possible if not desirable.
The impossibility of peace as an absolute yields to ways of war that match
a combatant’s preferences of battle. Ways of war are tied to conventional
strength of arms, a concession to conventional arms as the best kind of
war and as the “American” way of war.16 Some question this
characterization as too ridged given numerous American instances of
waging protracted war as something well short of decisive battle.17 Still,
the ideal matters most here, a western way of war pursued by more actors
than the United States and always as one of seeking a quick victory by
killing the enemy to account for battlefield supremacy and thereby garner
a political windfall.18 Should one enjoy a preponderance of strength in
terms of physical arms, many deem that kind of war best and pursue it. If
one considers themselves weak in terms of conventional strength, they
pursue a cognitive challenge. In either case, the belligerents assume that
conventional force of arms predicated on a physical strength of arms
works best. That disposition nets political gain from the sheer helplessness
of the opponent, now unable to defend themselves and survive and so they
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sue for peace, or just capitulate, or have that decree forced upon them by
the victor.
That result means so much to military thinking about war that in the eyes
of those charged with fighting the next war, cyber’s ability to replace such
a framework cannot stand as the new reality. But the context to change
one’s mind, the true aim of war, has become overt in purpose and means
in cyberspace, an intellectual exchange online meaning that combatants
achieve an absolute—war without violence. That such an absolute has
found its way into cyberspace spells an end of militarism. Cognitive
warfare there means no war in terms of a measure of violence, and this
advancement seemingly deprives military professionals of their foremost
reason for being.
Consequently, military retrenchment came in the face of the tremendous
success of cyber rendering war a cognitive clash and therefore one of
morality and values determining the winner. The clash of wills requires a
clash over the ideas shaping both qualities, or cyber ideology. The obvious
refrain broke out among those so marginalized and added to the chorus of
doubters that Internet realities had added anything dynamic and positive
to the human condition. For even if war had assumed cognitive
parameters, those on the losing end of this conflict would resort to military
force that did produce acts of violence. Moreover, the certainty of violence
was not humanity faltering before achievement. War always constituted a
physical state of competition, a clash netting violent outcomes. Cyber war
poses as no more than a breeding ground for that inevitable contest of
arms as a material confrontation. The intellect bowed before brawn, or, as
is a constant refrain, the pen is mightier than the sword but no match for a
gun.
Because of cyber, one could no longer merely recognize what amount of
physical force a military actor might need to find their place on the
continuum. The purely cognitive struggle now unleashed in the cyber
domain spoke less to force of arms and more to a bloodless contest that
spoke to the best of the human condition. Taken together, conflict
certainly would remain a human blight, but the virtue of nonviolence now
defined this cognitive war online.
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A cyber spectrum of conflict looks like this, or where things started (see
Figure 12):
Figure 12
Peace
Cyber Domain

War
Cross Domain Cyber

Cyber tensions abound but dictate engagement short of violence across the
spectrum. This limited reach meant a standalone, cognitive struggle in
cyberspace. In drawing this conclusion, one must not fall victim to the
artificially linear thinking a continuum invites. Naturally cross-domain
interaction allows cyber actions to impact the other domains. But one can
distinguish the frequency and composition of actions unfolding only in
cyberspace from those in other domains by the lack of physical force
involved in any such attacks. That separation renders conflict there a
fundamentally standalone confrontation over the openness of that
domain. Physical connectedness remains, while belligerents contest logical
access. An ideological struggle to preserve that quality of openness ensues,
and those operating in cyberspace, as one expert put it, must recognize
that the cyber war means the domains of land, sea, air, and space serve
cyberspace rather than the cyber domain merely augmenting these other
domains via cyber warfare:
…cyber warfare will have a strategic effect by acting as [the]
primary means to achieve conventional ends, hence will
induce a paradigm shift from the conventional notion of cyber
warfare as a tactical force multiplier to the notion of strategic
cyber warfare acting as [the] primary means of achieving
grand strategic objectives in the contemporary world order.19
Embracing the old meant losing sight of the new. And it was true that
embracing war as a physical contest netting acts of violence to dictate a
winner meant little had changed. For war gives up on intellect as a means
of settling disputes. In fact, physical brute force meant an admission of a
bankruptcy of ideas, a paucity of intellect that one could only overcome via
acts of violence. Even noble acts or justified causes could not survive this
test since that mandate of virtue rested on the beholder and spoke again to
division among humans; they could not agree on a single principle of right
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and wrong, that is, until cyberspace. Here intellectualism spoke to
humanness plain and simple, a desire to get past bloodshed as an arbiter
of war. And best of all, the nation that wielded the physical brawn so tied
to war as an act of violence had produced the medium that challenged that
thinking. The United States could use its military reach to force conflict
into the cyber domain, into an intellectual space where its values and
societal norms of shared communication and knowledge to selfimprovement could reign supreme. The distinction represents a thin line
but a clear line. Physical violence defining war remains a reality, but the
strongest nation engaged in such acts only to compel a cognitive war in
cyberspace. The spectrum of conflict in the hands of the U.S. military has
achieved its foremost purpose. Far from eclipse, the threat of military
force proves essential to waging the cyber war.
Pursuing this other view makes cyberspace a monumental moment and
achievement. Cyberspace can turn technology into an unquestioned good,
can overcome the human schemes to always be at war, and can at last
serve as a testimony to human intellectual achievement. That domain can
do so without contemplating a future pointing to an idealized end
promising a harmony that saddens the triumph of connectivity. This
domain embraces a full expression of the human condition and its ability
to seek out connections to make this self-actualization happen while
having to contend with pitfalls and resistance. It remains a marvelous
triumph speaking well of humanity, the United States, and of an optimistic
future. Far from becoming vulnerable because of an inability to better
place the cyber domain in a familiar context of military conflict as an act of
violence, this impossibility speaks well of the outcome of waging war there.
Any conflict in this domain features one of ideology. That clash reveals
that those embracing openness stand to reap an ideological advantage and
profit from online existence muting violence along the spectrum of
conflict. This needed goal requires the United States quell the instability at
home born of Internet conspiracy theories, all the while preserving an
Internet minimizing government controls. To find that balance will model
how democracy can function in an Internet age and allow the United
States to win the digital war by continuing to advance democratic
principles globally.
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